The pre-migrate backup failed with "mysqldump exited 2" and nothing else.
Reproduced on the host with stderr captured:
ERROR 1045: Plugin caching_sha2_password could not be loaded:
/usr/lib/mariadb/plugin/caching_sha2_password.so: No such file or directory
Alpine's `mysql-client` is MariaDB's client and ships an EMPTY plugin
directory, so it cannot perform caching_sha2_password — MySQL 8.4's default and
effectively only auth method. `mariadb-connector-c` provides the plugin.
This was never about the deploy backup alone. Every mysqldump/mysql call from
the API container was broken, which means the whole Operaciones panel — backup,
restore, sync, re-import — could not work in a container. It went unnoticed
because that feature had only ever been run with the API on a developer
machine, where the Oracle client is installed. Verified after the fix: dump
exits 0, gzip valid, 31 CREATE TABLEs.
Also fixed, both found while chasing the above:
- The backup script reported an exit code and nothing else, because a detached
exec captures no output — which is precisely why this needed a manual
reproduction. mysqldump's stderr is now redirected to a file and read back
through a short attached exec on failure, so the deploy log states the cause.
Verified against live prod: the log now carries the 1045 line itself.
- Listing ONLY 100.100.100.100 as the containers' resolver costs them public
DNS, since MagicDNS does not forward upstream unless the tailnet defines
global nameservers. Nothing at runtime needed it, but `apk` inside the
container stopped resolving, and anything outbound would have too. A public
fallback resolver is now listed after MagicDNS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
245 lines
8.5 KiB
JavaScript
245 lines
8.5 KiB
JavaScript
#!/usr/bin/env node
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/**
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* Take a mysqldump immediately before a deploy runs `prisma migrate deploy`.
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*
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* Why it is done THIS way and not with a plain `mysqldump` on the CI runner:
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* a dump is only useful if a human can restore it, and the only restore path
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* this platform has is the "Operaciones" admin screen, which lists and replays
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* whatever `*.sql.gz` files sit in the API container's BACKUP_DIR volume
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* (apps/api/src/ops/ops.service.ts — listBackups / RESTORE). A dump written on
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* the runner would land nowhere anybody can reach. So we drive the dump INSIDE
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* the still-running old API container, via Portainer's Docker API proxy: the
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* container already has mysql-client baked in (docker/api.Dockerfile), and the
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* file lands in the exact directory the restore UI reads.
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*
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* It must therefore run BEFORE the app stack is re-applied, while the previous
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* container is still up.
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*
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* Required env:
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* PORTAINER_URL https://<host>:9443
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* PORTAINER_API_KEY Portainer access token
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* PORTAINER_ENDPOINT_ID numeric endpoint id (galactus = 3)
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* DATABASE_URL mysql://user:pass@host:port/db
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* BACKUP_TAG label for the filename, e.g. the deployed tag
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* Optional env:
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* ALLOW_MISSING_CONTAINER=true exit 0 when no API container exists yet
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* (first-ever deploy — nothing to back up)
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* API_CONTAINER_LABEL=io.jorgecuadros.role=api
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* EXEC_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=1800
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*
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* TLS: Portainer here uses a self-signed certificate. The caller is expected to
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* set NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0 for this step; see the workflow. That
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* disables verification for the whole process, so nothing else should run in it.
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*/
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const PORTAINER_URL = required("PORTAINER_URL").replace(/\/+$/, "");
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const API_KEY = required("PORTAINER_API_KEY");
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const ENDPOINT_ID = required("PORTAINER_ENDPOINT_ID");
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const DATABASE_URL = required("DATABASE_URL");
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const BACKUP_TAG = required("BACKUP_TAG");
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const CONTAINER_LABEL =
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process.env.API_CONTAINER_LABEL ?? "io.jorgecuadros.role=api";
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const ALLOW_MISSING = process.env.ALLOW_MISSING_CONTAINER === "true";
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const TIMEOUT_MS =
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Number(process.env.EXEC_TIMEOUT_SECONDS ?? 1800) * 1000;
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function required(name) {
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const v = process.env[name];
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if (!v) {
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console.error(`missing required env: ${name}`);
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process.exit(1);
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}
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return v;
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}
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const DOCKER = `${PORTAINER_URL}/api/endpoints/${ENDPOINT_ID}/docker`;
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async function docker(path, init = {}) {
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const res = await fetch(`${DOCKER}${path}`, {
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...init,
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headers: {
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"X-API-Key": API_KEY,
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...(init.body ? { "Content-Type": "application/json" } : {}),
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...(init.headers ?? {}),
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},
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});
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const text = await res.text();
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if (!res.ok) {
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throw new Error(`docker ${path} -> ${res.status} ${text.slice(0, 400)}`);
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}
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return text ? JSON.parse(text) : null;
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}
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/** Single-quote for `sh -c`, the same discipline ops.service.ts uses. */
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function shq(value) {
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return `'${String(value).replace(/'/g, `'\\''`)}'`;
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}
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function parseDbUrl(raw) {
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const u = new URL(raw);
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return {
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host: u.hostname,
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port: u.port || "3306",
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user: decodeURIComponent(u.username),
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password: decodeURIComponent(u.password),
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database: u.pathname.replace(/^\//, ""),
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};
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}
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/** Matches ops.service.ts's own naming: ISO, colons and dots flattened. */
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function timestamp() {
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return new Date()
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.toISOString()
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.replace(/[:.]/g, "-")
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.replace("T", "_")
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.slice(0, 19);
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}
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/**
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* ops.service.ts refuses to restore any name outside this character set, so a
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* file we write with, say, a `+` in the tag would be permanently unrestorable
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* through the UI. Sanitise before writing, not after.
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*/
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function safeTag(tag) {
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return tag.replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9._-]/g, "-");
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}
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async function findApiContainer() {
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const [key, value] = CONTAINER_LABEL.split("=");
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const filters = encodeURIComponent(
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JSON.stringify({ label: [`${key}=${value}`], status: ["running"] }),
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);
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const list = await docker(`/containers/json?filters=${filters}`);
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return list.length ? list[0] : null;
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}
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/**
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* Run a command in the container and return its exit code. Detach:true keeps
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* this to plain HTTP — a non-detached exec start hijacks the connection into a
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* raw stream, which fetch cannot read. The cost is that we get no stdout, so
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* every check below has to be expressed as an exit code.
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*/
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async function execInContainer(containerId, cmd, env = []) {
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const created = await docker(`/containers/${containerId}/exec`, {
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method: "POST",
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body: JSON.stringify({
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AttachStdout: false,
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AttachStderr: false,
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Tty: false,
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Env: env,
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Cmd: ["sh", "-c", cmd],
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}),
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});
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await docker(`/exec/${created.Id}/start`, {
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method: "POST",
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body: JSON.stringify({ Detach: true, Tty: false }),
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});
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const deadline = Date.now() + TIMEOUT_MS;
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for (;;) {
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const info = await docker(`/exec/${created.Id}/json`);
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if (!info.Running) return info.ExitCode ?? 1;
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if (Date.now() > deadline) {
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throw new Error(`exec timed out after ${TIMEOUT_MS / 1000}s`);
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}
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await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 3000));
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}
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}
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/**
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* Run a SHORT command and return its combined output.
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*
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* Detached exec cannot report why anything failed, which once reduced a real
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* failure to the single line "mysqldump exited 2" and cost a manual
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* reproduction on the host to discover it was a missing auth plugin. Tty:true
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* makes the start response a plain (non-multiplexed) stream that can just be
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* read, at the cost of holding the connection open — fine for reading a small
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* error file, which is why the dump itself still runs detached.
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*/
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async function execCapture(containerId, cmd) {
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const created = await docker(`/containers/${containerId}/exec`, {
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method: "POST",
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body: JSON.stringify({
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AttachStdout: true,
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AttachStderr: true,
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Tty: true,
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Cmd: ["sh", "-c", cmd],
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}),
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});
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const res = await fetch(`${DOCKER}/exec/${created.Id}/start`, {
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method: "POST",
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headers: { "X-API-Key": API_KEY, "Content-Type": "application/json" },
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body: JSON.stringify({ Detach: false, Tty: true }),
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});
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return (await res.text()).trim();
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}
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async function main() {
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const container = await findApiContainer();
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if (!container) {
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const message = `no running container matching label ${CONTAINER_LABEL}`;
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if (ALLOW_MISSING) {
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console.warn(`skipping pre-migrate backup: ${message}`);
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return;
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}
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throw new Error(
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`${message} — pass bootstrap=true only if this is the first deploy and ` +
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`there is genuinely no data to lose`,
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);
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}
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const conn = parseDbUrl(DATABASE_URL);
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const file = `pre-migrate-${safeTag(BACKUP_TAG)}-${timestamp()}.sql.gz`;
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const out = `/data/backups/${file}`;
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console.log(`container : ${container.Id.slice(0, 12)}`);
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console.log(`database : ${conn.user}@${conn.host}:${conn.port}/${conn.database}`);
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console.log(`writing : ${out}`);
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// Password via MYSQL_PWD in the exec env, never on the command line — argv is
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// world-readable through `ps` inside the container.
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const flags = `--host=${conn.host} --port=${conn.port} --user=${shq(conn.user)}`;
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const errFile = "/tmp/pre-migrate-backup.err";
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const dump =
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`set -o pipefail; mysqldump ${flags} --single-transaction --routines ` +
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`--triggers --no-tablespaces ${shq(conn.database)} 2>${errFile} ` +
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`| gzip -c > ${shq(out)}`;
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const code = await execInContainer(container.Id, dump, [
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`MYSQL_PWD=${conn.password}`,
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]);
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if (code !== 0) {
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// An exit code alone is not actionable — surface what mysqldump actually
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// said. Leave the truncated file behind for inspection, but never let the
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// deploy proceed believing it has a restore point.
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const stderr = await execCapture(
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container.Id,
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`tail -20 ${errFile} 2>/dev/null`,
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);
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throw new Error(
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`mysqldump exited ${code} — refusing to migrate` +
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(stderr ? `\n--- mysqldump stderr ---\n${stderr}` : ""),
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);
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}
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// Detached exec gives no stdout, so prove the artefact separately: non-empty
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// file, and gzip that actually decompresses. A dump that fails mid-stream can
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// still leave a plausible-looking file.
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const verify = await execInContainer(
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container.Id,
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`test -s ${shq(out)} && gzip -t ${shq(out)}`,
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);
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if (verify !== 0) {
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throw new Error(`backup ${file} is empty or corrupt (check exited ${verify})`);
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}
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console.log(`ok: ${file} written and verified in the API backup volume`);
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}
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main().catch((err) => {
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console.error(`pre-migrate backup FAILED: ${err.message}`);
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process.exit(1);
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});
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