'use strict';

// RFB protocol handling for the hub.
//
// The hub is a man-in-the-middle by design: it completes the RFB handshake with
// the real VNC server itself (including VNC Authentication using a password the
// browser never receives), and separately presents a "no authentication needed"
// handshake to the browser. Once both sides are past ServerInit the two streams
// are spliced together.
//
// That MITM position is also what makes view-only enforceable: the client->server
// direction is parsed and input-bearing messages are dropped, so a viewer cannot
// send keystrokes no matter what its browser does.

const { vncAuthResponse } = require('./des');

const SEC_NONE = 1;
const SEC_VNC_AUTH = 2;

/**
 * Reads exact byte counts off a Readable without putting it into flowing mode,
 * so anything we do not consume stays in the stream's internal buffer and is
 * picked up by the later pipe().
 */
class ByteReader {
  constructor(stream, timeoutMs = 20_000) {
    this.stream = stream;
    this.timeoutMs = timeoutMs;
  }

  read(n) {
    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
      const attempt = () => {
        const buf = this.stream.read(n);
        if (buf) {
          cleanup();
          resolve(buf);
        }
      };
      const onEnd = () => {
        cleanup();
        reject(new Error('connection closed during RFB handshake'));
      };
      const onError = (err) => {
        cleanup();
        reject(err);
      };
      const timer = setTimeout(() => {
        cleanup();
        reject(new Error('timed out during RFB handshake'));
      }, this.timeoutMs);

      const cleanup = () => {
        clearTimeout(timer);
        this.stream.off('readable', attempt);
        this.stream.off('end', onEnd);
        this.stream.off('close', onEnd);
        this.stream.off('error', onError);
      };

      this.stream.on('readable', attempt);
      this.stream.on('end', onEnd);
      this.stream.on('close', onEnd);
      this.stream.on('error', onError);
      attempt();
    });
  }

  async readU8() {
    return (await this.read(1))[0];
  }

  async readU32() {
    return (await this.read(4)).readUInt32BE(0);
  }

  // RFB failure reasons are a u32 length followed by that many bytes of text.
  async readReason() {
    const len = await this.readU32();
    if (!len) return '';
    return (await this.read(Math.min(len, 4096))).toString('utf8');
  }
}

function parseVersion(buf) {
  const text = buf.toString('ascii');
  const m = /^RFB (\d{3})\.(\d{3})\n$/.exec(text);
  if (!m) throw new Error(`not a VNC server (got ${JSON.stringify(text)})`);
  return { major: Number(m[1]), minor: Number(m[2]) };
}

/**
 * Act as a VNC *client* toward the real server: version negotiation, security
 * negotiation, VNC Authentication if required. Returns once the server is ready
 * for ClientInit, which the browser will supply.
 */
async function handshakeWithServer(stream, password, timeoutMs = 20_000) {
  const r = new ByteReader(stream, timeoutMs);

  const { major, minor: rawMinor } = parseVersion(await r.read(12));
  // Apple advertises 003.889; anything above 3.8 is negotiated down to 3.8.
  const minor = rawMinor > 8 ? 8 : rawMinor;
  const negotiated = minor >= 8 ? 8 : minor >= 7 ? 7 : 3;
  stream.write(Buffer.from(`RFB 003.00${negotiated}\n`, 'ascii'));

  let secType;
  if (negotiated >= 7) {
    const count = await r.readU8();
    if (count === 0) throw new Error(`server refused connection: ${await r.readReason()}`);
    const types = Array.from(await r.read(count));

    if (password && types.includes(SEC_VNC_AUTH)) secType = SEC_VNC_AUTH;
    else if (types.includes(SEC_NONE)) secType = SEC_NONE;
    else if (types.includes(SEC_VNC_AUTH)) {
      throw new Error('VNC server requires a password but none is stored for this client');
    } else {
      throw new Error(`no supported VNC security type (server offered ${types.join(', ')})`);
    }
    stream.write(Buffer.from([secType]));
  } else {
    secType = await r.readU32();
    if (secType === 0) throw new Error(`server refused connection: ${await r.readReason()}`);
    if (secType === SEC_VNC_AUTH && !password) {
      throw new Error('VNC server requires a password but none is stored for this client');
    }
  }

  if (secType === SEC_VNC_AUTH) {
    const challenge = await r.read(16);
    stream.write(vncAuthResponse(challenge, password));
  } else if (secType !== SEC_NONE) {
    throw new Error(`unsupported VNC security type ${secType}`);
  }

  // 3.8 always sends SecurityResult; earlier versions only send it for real auth.
  if (negotiated >= 8 || secType !== SEC_NONE) {
    const result = await r.readU32();
    if (result !== 0) {
      const reason = negotiated >= 8 ? await r.readReason().catch(() => '') : '';
      throw new Error(reason || 'VNC authentication failed (wrong password?)');
    }
  }

  return { version: `${major}.${rawMinor}`, securityType: secType };
}

/**
 * Act as a VNC *server* toward the browser, offering "None" security. By the
 * time this runs the hub has already authenticated upstream, so the browser is
 * handed an already-authorised stream and never sees the real password.
 */
async function handshakeWithBrowser(stream, timeoutMs = 20_000) {
  const r = new ByteReader(stream, timeoutMs);

  stream.write(Buffer.from('RFB 003.008\n', 'ascii'));
  const { minor } = parseVersion(await r.read(12));

  if (minor >= 7) {
    stream.write(Buffer.from([1, SEC_NONE]));
    const chosen = await r.readU8();
    if (chosen !== SEC_NONE) {
      const reason = Buffer.from('unsupported security type', 'utf8');
      const buf = Buffer.alloc(8 + reason.length);
      buf.writeUInt32BE(1, 0);
      buf.writeUInt32BE(reason.length, 4);
      reason.copy(buf, 8);
      stream.write(buf);
      throw new Error('browser chose an unsupported security type');
    }
    // SecurityResult: OK
    const ok = Buffer.alloc(4);
    ok.writeUInt32BE(0, 0);
    stream.write(ok);
  } else {
    // RFB 3.3: the server dictates the security type and sends no SecurityResult.
    const buf = Buffer.alloc(4);
    buf.writeUInt32BE(SEC_NONE, 0);
    stream.write(buf);
  }
}

/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
/* View-only enforcement                                                     */
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */

// Client-to-server messages that cannot change anything on the remote machine.
// Everything else is dropped for viewers — notably KeyEvent, PointerEvent,
// ClientCutText (paste), SetDesktopSize and xvp (which can power off a host).
const PASSIVE_MESSAGES = new Set([
  0,   // SetPixelFormat
  2,   // SetEncodings
  3,   // FramebufferUpdateRequest
  150, // EnableContinuousUpdates
  248, // ClientFence
]);

/**
 * Length of the client->server message starting at offset 0 of `buf`.
 * Returns 0 when more bytes are needed, -1 when the type is unknown (which means
 * we can no longer track message boundaries and must drop the connection).
 */
function clientMessageLength(buf) {
  const type = buf[0];
  switch (type) {
    case 0: return 20;                              // SetPixelFormat
    case 2:                                         // SetEncodings
      if (buf.length < 4) return 0;
      return 4 + 4 * buf.readUInt16BE(2);
    case 3: return 10;                              // FramebufferUpdateRequest
    case 4: return 8;                               // KeyEvent
    case 5: return 6;                               // PointerEvent
    case 6:                                         // ClientCutText
      if (buf.length < 8) return 0;
      // A negative length marks the extended clipboard extension.
      return 8 + Math.abs(buf.readInt32BE(4));
    case 150: return 10;                            // EnableContinuousUpdates
    case 248:                                       // ClientFence
      if (buf.length < 9) return 0;
      return 9 + buf[8];
    case 250: return 4;                             // xvp (shutdown/reboot/reset)
    case 251:                                       // SetDesktopSize
      if (buf.length < 8) return 0;
      return 8 + 16 * buf[6];
    case 255:                                       // QEMU client message
      if (buf.length < 2) return 0;
      if (buf[1] === 0) return 12;                  // QEMU Extended Key Event
      return -1;
    default:
      return -1;
  }
}

/**
 * Incremental filter for the browser->server direction of a view-only session.
 * Feed it chunks; it returns only the bytes that are safe to forward.
 */
class ViewOnlyFilter {
  constructor() {
    this.pending = Buffer.alloc(0);
    this.blocked = 0;
  }

  push(chunk) {
    this.pending = this.pending.length ? Buffer.concat([this.pending, chunk]) : chunk;
    const keep = [];

    while (this.pending.length > 0) {
      const len = clientMessageLength(this.pending);
      if (len === -1) {
        throw new Error(`unparseable client message type ${this.pending[0]} in view-only session`);
      }
      if (len === 0 || this.pending.length < len) break;

      const msg = this.pending.subarray(0, len);
      if (PASSIVE_MESSAGES.has(msg[0])) keep.push(Buffer.from(msg));
      else this.blocked++;

      this.pending = this.pending.subarray(len);
    }

    if (!keep.length) return null;
    return keep.length === 1 ? keep[0] : Buffer.concat(keep);
  }
}

module.exports = {
  ByteReader,
  handshakeWithServer,
  handshakeWithBrowser,
  ViewOnlyFilter,
  clientMessageLength,
  SEC_NONE,
  SEC_VNC_AUTH,
};