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feat(policy-ocr): suggest the customer from the printed insured name
The office books customers surname-first ("WAGONER, PAMELA") and carriers
print them given-name-first ("PAMELA DENISE WAGONER"), so the review screen
made staff retype a name the parser had already read. Comparing normalized
token sets makes the two orderings the same thing.

Only on the zero-hit path, where the policy number found nothing and a human
has to pick a customer anyway. The suggestions are written to a new
`customerSuggestions` column rather than `matchCandidates`, which the review
screen reads as policy-number hits, and they never set `matchedCustomerId` or
`confident` — matching on `Policy.policyNumber` is unchanged.

Two tiers, drawn where the real book has cliffs: EXACT (identical token sets)
and PARTIAL (containment, >=2 shared tokens, surname present). Of 1536
customers, 1487 have a distinct token set, so EXACT cross-person collisions
are ~0; loosen to surname + first given name and 131 (8.5%) collide, and 185
surnames are shared by 524 customers, which is why one token is never enough
and the surname must be printed explicitly. Replaying every book row as a
carrier would print it: 97.9% top-ranked correct, 1.2% a different row, all
but two of those the same human on a duplicate or variant row.

Normalization folds accents (OCR's MUNOZ reaches the book's MUÑOZ), drops
initials, Spanish particles, JR/S.A. DE C.V., and any token with a digit —
ANA prints the phone hard against the name as `Ph.3102001538`. Names over 8
tokens or 80 characters are refused outright, because GMX's especificación
has no field labels and the parser has handed its whole first page over as
`insuredName`.

Not used for utility statements: there the registrant genuinely is not the
customer, so the same trick would be wrong rather than noisy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-15 12:37:23 -07:00

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# Insurance Policy OCR Capture
Reads an insurance policy PDF the office downloads from a carrier portal,
proposes the `Policy` row it should become, and lets staff confirm. Built
2026-08-01 (`5e9cb12`), live under `/polizas/captura`.
## Why this exists — it was not planned
This feature is **not in any spec**. It came out of building the utility
statement OCR intake in [`RECEIPT_CAPTURE_SPEC.md`](RECEIPT_CAPTURE_SPEC.md)
§2: once there was a working render → OCR → parse → match → review pipeline
for CFE/CESPT/Telnor receipts, it was obvious the same shape applies to the
*other* stack of paper this office keys in by hand every week — the carrier
policy PDFs behind every `Policy` row.
The two are the same job with a different document on the scanner. Keeping
that recognition cheap is the whole point of how it was built: the pipeline
was **reused, not copied**.
- `OcrModule` (`apps/api/src/ocr/ocr.module.ts`) was extracted out of
`StatementsModule` in this same commit, purely so `PolicyOcrModule` can
inject `OCR_PROVIDER` without dragging in the statement pipeline.
`StatementsModule` now imports it and binds nothing itself. That extraction
was **blocking**: without it the policy module could not resolve the
provider at all.
- The engine stays Tesseract behind the same swappable seam, so a managed
extraction API remains a one-line change in one file for both features.
- The intake screen is a *mode of* the existing policy-creation screen, the
same way OCR receipt capture is a mode of Captura — not a new menu entry.
## What ships
| Piece | Path |
|---|---|
| API module | `apps/api/src/policy-ocr/` (service, controller, DTOs, matcher, parser) |
| Shared OCR seam | `apps/api/src/ocr/ocr.module.ts` |
| Tables | `policy_ocr_batches`, `policy_ocr_documents` (`20260801000000_policy_ocr_intake`, extended by `20260815120000_policy_ocr_ana` and `20260815160000_policy_type_repair`) |
| Web | `components/PolicyCaptura.tsx` (tab shell), `PolicyOcrIntake.tsx` (upload), `PolicyOcrReview.tsx` (review queue) |
| Abilities | `policy:ingest`, `policy:ocr-review` — both **STAFF** |
Abilities are STAFF for the same reason statement OCR is: nothing reaches the
books unconfirmed, and the review step is what makes machine capture safe at
that tier.
## The screen
`PolicyCaptura` is one screen with two ways in, mirroring `Captura.tsx`:
- `/polizas/nuevo`**manual** tab (`PolicyForm`, every field by hand)
- `/polizas/captura`**automática** tab (`PolicyOcrIntake`, drop a PDF)
- `/polizas/captura/[id]` → the batch review queue
Both modes end at the same place — a `Policy` row on a customer's file — so
they are modes of one screen rather than two menu entries. Either URL renders
the same component, so the tab toggle works from either entry point and old
bookmarks land on the right tab.
## Pipeline
```
upload PDF → store source → render pages → text layer? → parse → match → review → confirm
```
1. **Store the source.** `policy-ocr/{batchId}/source-N.pdf`, before anything
else touches it.
2. **Render + read.** Every page is rendered to
`policy-ocr/{batchId}/page-M.png`. Text-layer wins when the PDF has one
(cheap, exact); the rendered image is OCR'd only when it does not — the
same precedence rule as the statement pipeline. Carrier-portal PDFs are
usually born-digital, so most of the time no OCR runs at all.
3. **Parse.** Provider detected by brand signal first
(`GMX`, `Grupo Mexicano de Seguros`, `gmx.com.mx`,
`JUNTOS EL RIESGO ES MENOR`), layout patterns only as fallback — the same
ordering rule the statement parser needed.
4. **Match.** Against `Policy.policyNumber`.
5. **Review + confirm.** Nothing is written to `Policy` until a human
confirms.
### One PDF = one policy
This is the sharpest difference from statement OCR, and it inverts that
feature's core assumption.
Utility statements arrive **bundled, one customer per page** — so there, one
page is one document and the parser runs per page. A policy PDF is the
opposite: the GMX certificate is a 2-page document where page 1 carries the
contract header and page 2 carries the per-coverage table (and the PVL
especificación runs to ten), and **every page describes the same policy**. So
the pipeline concatenates every page's text
(`\n\n` between pages, which also keeps `ocrRawText` readable for debugging)
and runs the parser and the matcher exactly **once per file**.
Consequences worth knowing before touching this code:
- `PolicyOcrDocument.pageNumber` is repurposed as the **file ordinal within
the batch** (1, 2, 3…), not a page index. The
`(batchId, pageNumber)` unique constraint still holds, and one batch still
carries many policies — one per uploaded file.
- Parser regexes are anchored across the whole concatenated text (`^From$`,
`^Currency\s+…`), which is why the page-boundary blank line matters.
- `ocrConfidence` on the row is the **mean** across the file's pages.
- A file that fails to parse produces exactly one `OCR_FAILED` row — the right
granularity, and the page PNGs stay on disk for a re-run after a parser fix.
### `storageKey` is the source PDF, not a page image
`PolicyOcrDocument.storageKey` points at `source-N.pdf`. The review screen
embeds that file directly, so the reviewer looks at the **exact artifact the
office received** and gets the browser's native PDF scrolling, zoom and text
selection for free. Rendered PNGs are still written for future re-OCR or an
image-based audit, but nothing points at them as the document's identity.
(The statement side does the opposite — there `storageKey` is the page image,
because a page *is* the document.)
## Matching: policy number only, never the insured name
`PolicyMatcherService` matches on `Policy.policyNumber` and nothing else.
The certificate's "Insured" line is the account's registrant, which drifts
from the customer the office actually holds the file under — the same finding
the statement matcher is built around (a CESPT receipt reading
`ARNAIZ ROSAS ELSA AURORA` for a customer this office holds as `CATT, RANDY`).
Names are shown to the reviewer as a sanity check and never feed matching.
| Rows on `policyNumber` | Result |
|---|---|
| exactly 1 | `MATCHED`, confident — the only unambiguous hit |
| 0 | new policy: review offers a customer picker, confirm **creates** the row |
| >1 | surfaced as candidates, human picks |
More than one hit is never auto-resolved. Duplicate policy numbers across
customers do occur (one group policy bound by two related parties), and
picking arbitrarily would silently book the wrong coverage against the wrong
person.
### Name suggestions on the zero-hit path
When the policy number finds nothing — the new-policy case, where a human has
to pick a customer anyway — `name-matcher.ts` ranks the customer book against
the printed insured name and the review screen offers the top three as
one-click buttons above the picker. They are written to
`policy_ocr_documents.customerSuggestions`, deliberately **not** to
`matchCandidates`, so a name hint can never be read as a policy-number hit.
Nothing sets `matchedCustomerId`; the rule above is unchanged.
The problem is only ordering: the office books customers surname-first
(`WAGONER, PAMELA`) and carriers print them given-name-first
(`PAMELA DENISE WAGONER`), so a string compare never hits while a **token-set**
compare does. Names are normalized (accents folded, so OCR's `MUNOZ` reaches
the book's `MUÑOZ`; initials, `DE`/`LA`/`Y`, `JR`, `S.A. DE C.V.` and any token
containing a digit dropped — ANA prints the phone hard against the name as
`Ph.3102001538`). Two tiers:
| Tier | Rule |
|---|---|
| `EXACT` | identical token sets, any order |
| `PARTIAL` | one set contains the other, ≥2 shared tokens, **and** the surname is present |
Both thresholds come from measuring the real book (1536 customers):
- 1487 distinct token sets, so `EXACT` cross-person collisions are ~0
- loosen to surname + first given name and 131 customers (8.5%) collide —
the book holds `MCWILLIAMS, BRIAN MICHAEL` *and* `MCWILLIAMS, BRIAN`
- 185 surnames are shared by 524 customers, so one token is never evidence;
hence the ≥2 floor and the explicit surname requirement, which is what stops
`JERRY MARILYN` reaching `ESTRADA, JERRY & MARILYN` on given names alone
Replaying every book row as a carrier would print it (given-name-first, joint
spouse dropped): 97.9% top-ranked correct, 0.9% no suggestion, 1.2% a
different row — and all but two of those are the same human on a duplicate or
variant row (`MOLNAR, JANOS` vs `MOLNAR, JANOS`, `IBARRA, ISMAEL &`). The
two genuine wrong-person cases are `CUADROS, JORGE JR` against three
`CUADROS, JORGE H.`, and they appear as a tie in the list rather than as a
single answer.
A blob is refused outright (>8 tokens or >80 characters): GMX's especificación
has no field labels and the parser has been seen handing its whole first page
over as `insuredName`, which would find a surname somewhere in the prose.
`(SIN NOMBRE)` — 14 rows the migration left — is skipped on both sides.
**Not used for utility statements.** There the registrant genuinely is not the
customer (the `CATT, RANDY` finding above), so the same trick would be wrong,
not merely noisy.
## GMX ships two unrelated documents for the same policy
The office downloads both from the same portal, and either can land in a
batch. They share only the brand and the policy number, so `parseGmx` is a
two-line dispatcher over two real parsers — both returning `provider: "GMX"`,
because the matcher keys on the policy number alone and must not care which
artifact was uploaded.
| | **Caratula** (`…_Traduccion.pdf`) | **Especificación** (`…-CondicionesParticulares.pdf`) |
|---|---|---|
| Language | English (free translation) | Spanish |
| Shape | boxed header table + 4-column coverage table | 10 pages of prose, no tables at all |
| Header fields | Policy / Insured / Broker / Term / From / To / Currency | insured name, risk location, property description |
| Dates, broker, currency field | yes | **none printed** |
| Coverages | one row per risk | section heading + `Límite Máximo de Responsabilidad:` |
| Parser | `parseGmxCaratula` | `parseGmxEspecificacion` |
Selected by `isEspecificacion` on the PVL page header
(`ESPECIFICACIÓN QUE SE ADHIERE`, `PVL Hogar`, `Nombre del asegurado`).
Three things about the especificación are worth knowing before touching it:
- **The policy number's group widths differ between the two.** The caratula
reads `007-037-07005947-0000-02` and the especificación
`07-037-07006957-00000-01` — 2 digits in the first group, 5 in the fourth.
The original parser pinned the widths, so it read one family and returned
null on the other. `POLICY_NUMBER_SHAPE` now matches the shape, and since
the especificación prints the number on all ten page headers, the ten
readings cross-check each other (disagreement is noted, not resolved — the
same rule the zona federal parser applies to its clave).
- **Coverages are found by anchoring on the limit label and walking backwards
for the heading.** There is no row shape to match. A heading is a short line
*preceded by a blank line* — that last condition is the whole trick, since
length alone cannot tell a heading from the wrapped tail of the paragraph
above it (`efectuados.`, `Y CADA PÉRDIDA.`), and without it coverages get
named after the last word of the preceding prose.
- **Vigencia, agente and prima are absent by design**, not unread. The parser
says so in a note, so a reviewer seeing three empty fields does not read it
as a broken parse.
**These three are keyed in by hand** — confirmed 2026-08-14 with Luz, who
handles GMX policies at the office. The review screen already has editable
inputs for all three, and `postPremium` enables off the *typed* premium, so
a hand-entered prima posts to the ledger exactly like a parsed one. No code
change was needed to support this; it is a process decision, recorded here
because the parser's own note now instructs the reviewer accordingly.
> **A blank vigencia is silently permanent.** `Policy.policyTo` is nullable
> and the renewals window query filters `policyTo: { gte, lte }`
> (`renewals.service.ts`), so a policy confirmed without one **never matches
> and never gets a renewal notice** — no error, no warning, and nothing
> later notices. This is why the parser's note names the consequence instead
> of just listing the missing fields.
An excluded catastrophic risk is recorded as excluded **in the risk label**
(`Terremoto o erupción volcánica — Sección Edificio: EXCLUIDO`) with a null
amount, never as `0`: a coverage insured for zero and an excluded coverage are
the same number and very different facts, and `ParsedCoverage` has no field
for the distinction.
## A.N.A. ships two unrelated faces too
`A.N.A. Compañía de Seguros` is the Rosarito office's tourist auto book. Same
split as GMX, different reason: GMX ships two *documents about one policy*,
A.N.A. ships two *products*.
| | **AUTOMOBILE** (`SPECIAL POLICY FOR TOURISTS`) | **DRIVER´S POLICY** (the office says *licencia*) |
|---|---|---|
| Insures | a specific car | up to five named drivers, whatever they drive |
| Vehicle table | `ITEM / YEAR / MAKE / BODY / SERIAL No. / PLATES` | **none** |
| Insured | one `INSURED` cell | numbered `POLICY HOLDER` list |
| Value columns | one (`LIMIT OF LIABILITY`) | two (`SUM INSURED`, `PREMIUM`) |
| Sections | 9, numbered | 6, unnumbered, **in a different order** |
| Parser | `parseAnaAutomobile` | `parseAnaDriverPolicy` |
Selected by `isAnaDriverPolicy` on the title band.
The **four automobile products** the office sells — amplia and responsabilidad
civil, each annual or by-the-day — are the **same layout with different
numbers**. "Amplia" prints a vehicle value and `COVERED` on sections 12;
"resp. civil" prints `0.00` and `EXCLUDED`. That is data, not a layout, so
there is one parser rather than four.
Things worth knowing before touching the ANA parsers:
- **These are born-digital portal PDFs**, so `pdftotext -layout` returns exact
glyphs and exact columns. The driver's policy parser uses that: `SUM
INSURED` and `PREMIUM` print the same shape (`100,000.00 usd.` /
`18.70 usd.`) with no per-row label, so **horizontal position is the only
thing that separates them**. The split is computed from the header's own
column offsets rather than hardcoded, because they shift between products.
If a scan ever arrives without column fidelity, every amount is reported as
a sum insured and the reviewer is told the split failed.
- **The money row is read positionally, not by finding six amounts.** An
unused `DISCOUNT` prints as a bare `-`, so an "amounts in order" reading
shifts every value one column left on a discounted policy. The parser
requires exactly six whitespace-separated cells or reports the row unread.
- **Each PDF prints its face two or three times** (ORIGINAL, AGENT COPY, then
a summary receipt and three travel ID cards), and the pipeline concatenates
every page before parsing. The coverage walk is bounded to the first copy
and the driver list to the first `POLICY HOLDER` block. Unbounded, the
licencia returns the same person three times — which reads as a
three-driver policy, not as a bug, so nothing downstream would catch it.
- **Two five-digit numbers sit in the header band** and only one is the agent
clave: the other is the agent's own postal code
(`ROSARITO, BAJA CALIFORNIA 22710`). Likewise the agent's street address
reads `BENITO JUAREZ 25 No.50 INT 38`, three lines above the `No.` cell that
holds the policy number — hence the two-space floor after `No.`.
- **Sections 68 print a PREMIUM where the others print a limit.** $40 is what
legal aid *cost*, not a $40 liability limit, so it lands on
`ParsedCoverage.premium` (a field GMX never fills) and gets its own column
on the review screen. Adding the two together would be meaningless.
- **`coveragePeriodDays` matters here and nowhere else.** A.N.A. sells 3- and
4-day policies. `Policy.coveragePeriodDays` defaults to 365, so a weekend
policy left at the default sits in the renewals window a year out. The term
is derived from the two dates and cross-checked against the printed `DAYS`
cell; a disagreement is noted rather than resolved.
Exclusions follow the GMX rule — recorded in the risk label
(`MATERIAL DAMAGE — VEHICLE: EXCLUDED`) with a null amount, never as `0`. It
matters more here: a responsabilidad-civil policy prints `0.00` for material
damage, so the two are visually identical on the page.
### Vehicles and drivers
A.N.A. is the first provider whose face carries either, so confirm now writes
`Vehicle` and `InsuredDriver` rows alongside the `Policy`
(`applyVehiclesAndDrivers`). The parsed values are stored on the document as
`extractedVehiclesJson` / `extractedDriversJson` and shown read-only in the
review queue, so a misread VIN is catchable before it is applied.
Both inserts skip a row that already exists on the policy, matched on the
identifier the document prints — VIN then plate for a vehicle (A.N.A.'s
TRAILER and TOWING slots have no VIN), licence number then name for a driver.
The case that forces this is confirming a **renewal** onto an existing policy:
a blind insert leaves the customer with the same VIN listed twice and no way
to tell which row the renewal belongs to.
Nothing is ever updated or deleted there. A vehicle whose plate changed lands
as a second row for a human to reconcile — the safe half of the mistake, since
an overwrite would destroy the only record of what was insured last term.
The vehicle table is parsed **by token role, not by column offset**, because
`BODY` is the cell that wraps: `PACIFICA` is one token and `GENESIS SEDAN` is
two, so a fixed token count reads the VIN out of the wrong slot on the second.
The 17-character VIN is the anchor and `BODY` is whatever sits between the
make and it.
## What the parser reads, and the field it cannot
`ParsedPolicy` fields are all nullable on purpose: each carrier prints a
different subset, and the matcher and review queue both work better with
"field was read" vs "field was not" than with a guess.
Read from the GMX certificate: policy number, insured name, additional
insured, broker (→ `Policy.agentName`), legal address, ZIP, `policyFrom` /
`policyTo` / `policyDate`, currency, premium-payment cadence, and the full
per-coverage table (risk, insured amount, deductible, loss participation)
preserved verbatim.
Read from an A.N.A. face: all of the above except additional insured and
broker parens, **plus** the premium (A.N.A. prints it — see below), the policy
fee, the total, the term in days, the vehicle table, and the named drivers
with their US licence numbers. The tax and the agent clave have no column in
the schema and ride in the notes.
> **The GMX certificate carries no premium.** Not "sometimes missing" — the
> document does not have the figure. It lives on GMX's **separate `recibo`
> PDF**. The parser leaves `netPremium` / `policyFee` / `brokerFee` / `total`
> null and pushes a note onto the row —
> *"esta página no trae prima; revisar el recibo de GMX por separado"* — so
> the reviewer sees why the field is empty rather than assuming a read
> failure.
This is also why confirm never overwrites an existing `Policy.netPremium`
with null: the certificate not carrying a premium is not evidence that the
premium is gone.
A.N.A.'s faces do print one — the `DISCOUNT / PREMIUM / POLICY FEE / TAX /
LOCAL TAX / TOTAL` row is on the same page — so an ANA document reaches the
review queue with `netPremium` populated and `postPremium` already ticked.
Deductible and loss participation are stored as **strings** (`"5%"`, `"20%"`,
`"USD 1,000"`) — they are printed as a mix of percentages, currency amounts
and free text, and normalising them would lose the distinction.
## Policy type and carrier
Confirm sets `Policy.policyTypeId` and `Policy.insuranceProviderId` from what
the parser read.
| document | `policyTypeName` |
|---|---|
| ANA `AUTOMOBILE` | `AUTO` |
| ANA `DRIVER´S POLICY` | `LICENCIAS` |
| GMX caratula **and** especificación | `MULT` |
The parser emits a **name**, never an id — it is a pure function over text and
must not reach for the database, so `resolveLookups()` in the service turns the
name into a foreign key. A renamed lookup row is then a data change rather than
a parser change.
**Resolve, never create.** A missing `policy_types` row means a human deleted
it, and silently recreating it would undo that with no record. The field stays
null and the reviewer adds the row through the lookups screen. An explicit
`policyTypeId` / `insuranceProviderId` on the confirm payload always wins.
Two judgement calls worth recording:
- **GMX is `MULT`, not `INCENDIO`.** The caratula's own header reads "Multiple
Policy / Home" and the especificación is "PVL Hogar" — one product, two
artifacts. `MULT` is the live row carrying 769 of them; `INCENDIO` is
fire-only and no policy in the book has ever used it.
- **The parser's provider code is not the carrier's row name.** The office's
book is filed under `ANA SEGUROS`, so `PROVIDER_ROW_NAME` maps `ANA` onto it.
A bare `ANA` row with 1 policy also existed and is merged away by
`20260815160000_policy_type_repair`.
> **Deleting a lookup row used to be silent data loss.** `policies.policyTypeId`,
> `policies.insuranceProviderId` and `claims.adjusterId` are all
> `ON DELETE SET NULL`, and the lookups screen deleted unconditionally — so the
> delete returned 200 and blanked the field on every row that used it. That is
> how `M_EMPR` vanished and left 5 policies with no ramo, found months later by
> querying. All three deletes now refuse while the row is in use, naming it and
> the count. See `assertLookupUnused` and BACKLOG §2.1.
## Confirm: what actually gets written
Per confirmed document, in order:
1. **The `Policy` row** — updated if a policy was matched, created under the
picked customer if not. Only non-null `extracted*` fields are written; null
never overwrites existing data. `policyTypeId` and `insuranceProviderId` are
resolved first (above) and left untouched when unresolvable, so an existing
policy never loses a type or carrier it already had.
2. **`Vehicle` and `InsuredDriver` rows** — for the providers whose face
carries them (A.N.A.; never GMX Hogar), skipping any that already exist on
the policy. See *Vehicles and drivers* above.
3. **A `PolicyDocument`** — the source PDF is streamed into the policy's
storage namespace and attached, so the paperwork stays with the policy. Its
`documentType` is named after whichever parser claimed the page
(`ANA_POLICY`, `GMX_POLICY`).
4. **Optionally a `Transaction`**`INSURANCE` domain, negative amount
(a charge), `captureSource: "OCR"`, `captureRef` = the document id.
The ledger write is **opt-in twice over**: staff must tick `postPremium`
*and* a premium must have parsed to a positive number. Without that gate the
premium-less certificate above would silently book a $0 charge on every
confirm.
`createdPolicyId` and `postedTransactionId` are unique columns on the
document row, so a double-confirm cannot re-apply — and a `POSTED` document
is refused outright.
Discarding a batch is refused once any page is `POSTED`: a partly-applied
batch has already written `Policy` (and possibly `Transaction`) rows, and
hiding the paperwork behind a "discarded" label would leave those rows
unexplained. Reject the remaining pages individually instead.
## API surface
| Method | Route | Ability |
|---|---|---|
| `GET` | `/policy-ocr/status` (is OCR + storage available) | authenticated |
| `GET` | `/policy-ocr/batches`, `/batches/:id`, `/batches/:id/documents` | authenticated |
| `GET` | `/policy-ocr/documents/:id/page` (streams the source PDF) | authenticated |
| `POST` | `/policy-ocr/batches` (upload) | `policy:ingest` |
| `PATCH` | `/policy-ocr/documents/:id` (edit the extracted fields) | `policy:ocr-review` |
| `POST` | `/policy-ocr/documents/:id/reject` | `policy:ocr-review` |
| `POST` | `/policy-ocr/batches/:id/discard` | `policy:ocr-review` |
| `POST` | `/policy-ocr/batches/:id/confirm` | `policy:ocr-review` |
## Requirements
Same as statement OCR: object storage (`S3_ENDPOINT` + credentials) for the
source PDFs and page images, and `tesseract-ocr` / `tesseract-ocr-data-spa` /
`poppler-utils` in the API image. `GET /policy-ocr/status` reports both; if
either is missing the feature reports itself unavailable and only this
feature is disabled.
## Tests
`apps/api/src/policy-ocr/parsers/policy-parser.spec.ts` — 58 cases against
verbatim text extracted from five real documents, indentation and blank lines
included (the column positions are what the parser reads, so a cleaned-up
fixture would test nothing — and on A.N.A.'s driver's policy the offsets are
literally the only thing separating two columns).
From `HC_Folio_000767_Traduccion.pdf` (caratula): provider detection from the
wordmark and from the footer URL, the header fields, every coverage row off
the second page, the deductible/loss-participation strings, the
missing-premium note, the broker line with the agent-number parens absent,
and a page with no GMX signal at all (which must yield no provider rather
than a bad guess).
From `007_LGS-HGMX_07006957_01_0-CondicionesParticulares.pdf`
(especificación): the differently-grouped policy number, the risk location
read across its wrapped line, the empty `Asegurado Adicional` cell that must
not capture the next line, the absent-by-design fields, currency taken from
the USD limits rather than the M.N. sublimits in the body prose, a limit
split under `Edificio` / `Contenidos` sub-labels, a limit printed on the
label's own line, a deductible stated as a sentence *above* its limit, a
sublimit block whose amount sits after both a blank line and a page break,
the excluded earthquake coverage, and the hydrometeorological deductible and
coinsurance pulled from their own per-zone block.
Plus four cases in `apps/api/src/policies/lookup-delete-guard.spec.ts` pinning
the refusal that stops a lookup delete from silently blanking the rows that use
it, and four in the parser suite on the policy-type NAME each document yields.
From the three A.N.A. PDFs: brand detection (and that GMX's layout rules
cannot claim an ANA page), the header band, DD MM YYYY read out of three
separate column cells, the six money cells with `DISCOUNT` printed as a bare
`-`, the vehicle row with a one-word and a two-word `BODY` cell, the empty
TRAILER/TOWING slots, the agent street number and postal code that must *not*
be read as the policy number and clave, the declared values labelled by item
slot, the `$500.00` inside the deductible sentence that is not a sum insured,
the per-person/per-accident split in both of its printed forms, an add-on's
figure recorded as a premium, section 9's parenthesised limit, the by-the-day
term, the excluded sections, the column-position split on the driver's policy,
its different section order, and — for both faces — that a doubled or tripled
input yields one set of coverages and one driver rather than one per copy.
`apps/api/src/policy-ocr/name-matcher.spec.ts` — 21 cases on the customer name
suggestions, every fixture name lifted from the real book: the reversed name,
the printed middle name, the exact row outranking the row that merely contains
it, the joint account reached from one spouse (and refused when only given
names are printed), the Spanish double surname with the comma in either place,
the 54 rows with no comma at all, the `(SIN NOMBRE)` placeholder, a bare shared
surname, and the page-sized blob. Four more in
`policy-matcher.service.spec.ts` pin the wiring: suggestions on the zero-hit
and unreadable-number paths, no book read at all when the policy number hits,
and one book read across a batch.
Four of the GMX cases are regression tests for ways the parser can silently attach
the *wrong* value rather than none — a neighbouring coverage's prose read as
a deductible, the page-level `DEDUCIBLES:` paragraph read as one, a coverage
named after a wrapped prose tail, and one section's per-zone deductible
adopted by the coverage above it. Each was a real defect caught by running
the parser against the full ten-page document.
## Not built
- **GMX and A.N.A. only.** The dispatcher (`detectPolicyProvider`) is a table
of `[provider, pattern]` pairs plus a `parsers` map, so adding Qualitas is a
parser function and two entries — but no other carrier's layout has been
seen yet, and guessing at one produces a parser nobody can verify.
- **The `recibo` PDF.** Reading the premium off GMX's separate receipt
document, and pairing it to the certificate it belongs to, is the obvious
next piece. It is what would let `postPremium` stop being a manual tick.
- **Renewals from OCR.** A re-issued policy arrives as a new certificate with
the same number; confirm updates the existing row rather than versioning
it. Nothing tracks "this is the 2027 issue of that policy".
## Related
- [`STATEMENT_OCR.md`](STATEMENT_OCR.md) — the utility statement pipeline this
was lifted from, as built. [`RECEIPT_CAPTURE_SPEC.md`](RECEIPT_CAPTURE_SPEC.md)
§2 is its design and the measured evidence behind it. Between them they are
the origin of three rules the policy parser applies: detect the provider by brand before layout, only
ever apply the Tesseract digit-confusion map (`O→0`, `S→5`, `B→8`, …) to
fields known to be digits, and parse amounts by separator *position* rather
than assuming `,` is thousands.
Those last two are **duplicated on purpose**, not imported: the module is
kept self-contained, since sharing a helper would couple two unrelated
domains through it. If you fix a bug in one, check the other.
- [`INSURANCE_FEATURES_SPEC.md`](INSURANCE_FEATURES_SPEC.md) — the four
insurance features that *were* planned. This is not one of them.